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后根据所选取的变量，本文提出了一系列假设，并且选取了创业板 2009 年 58 家














































The research on executive pay has been the hot topic in the field of academy. 
With Growth Enterprise Board (GEB) in Shenzhen in China being set up in October 
of the year 2009, the executive pay problem in GEB drew much attention. According 
to the related studies, the executive pay index in GEB companies was too high, 
presenting serious excessive incentive phenomenon. So many senior managers of 
GEB companies cashed their shares by resignation in late one year. So we can't help 
thinking that the GEB executive pay mechanism was really the same as the present 
phenomenon? How the executive pay influences the corporate performance in GEB 
companies? If the executive compensation is really excessive, how to regulate the 
executive pay mechanism will be a question. 
Based on the above background, the paper reviews the domestic and foreign 
relevant literatures on executive compensation and corporate performance, thus 
explore the correlation between executive pay and corporate performance in Shenzhen 
GEB companies. According to the actual situation of the GEB companies, this paper 
identifies some variables which influence the above correlation and puts forward a 
series of assumptions. Then this paper selected 58 listed companies in 2009 and 187 
listed companies in 2010 in Shenzhen GEB as the sample data, to conduct the 
regression analysis tests. 
The findings show that: (1) Both executive cash salary and shareholding 
proportion positively influence the corporate performance in Shenzhen GEB 
companies. (2) The company size, debt risk, the economic development level of the 
region which GEB companies locate and corporate governance (including ownership 
concentration, the proportion of the independent directors, the present and CEO as the 
two separate positions) all have the positive effect on the correlation between 
executive cash pay and corporate performance in Shenzhen GEB companies. But the 
company growth and the shareholding proportion of institutional investors have the 















proportion of institutional investors and the economic development level of the region 
which GEB companies locate all have the positive effect on the correlation between 
executive shareholding proportion and corporate performance in Shenzhen GEB 
companies. Meanwhile, the company size has the negative effect on the above 
correlation, but the debt risk and corporate governance (including ownership 
concentration, the proportion of the independent directors, the present and CEO as the 
two separate positions) don’t have the significant influence on the correlation between 
executive shareholding proportion and corporate performance in Shenzhen GEB 
companies. Therefore, this paper suggests that we should enhance the correlation 
between executive pay and corporate performance in Shenzhen GEB companies and 
build a more effective and reasonable executive pay contracts from the following 
aspects, such as perfecting the legal laws and information disclosure system, 
designing the reasonable salary and equity incentive structure, improving the 
corporate governance and establishing the performance evaluation system of 
executives and so on. 
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提出建立创业板的建议。1999 年中国证监会首次表态要设立创业板。2000 年 10
月起，深圳证券交易所采取了一系列措施开始筹建。2001 年初，以 NASDAQ 为
代表的全球股票市场出现单边下跌，网络股泡沫破裂，全球创业板由热变冷，股
价大幅下跌，成交量严重萎缩。考虑到此时面临的极大风险，监管层押后了创业
板的启动时间。2003 年 10 月十六届二中全会决议通过推进风险投资和创业板市
场建设。2004 年 5 月 17 日，证监会正式同意深圳证交所在主板市场内设立中小
企业板块。此后五年时间内，《首次公开发行股票并在创业板上市管理暂行办法》、
《创业板市场投资者适当性管理暂行规定》等文件陆续出台。2009 年 10 月 23
日中国创业板正式启动，首批有 28 家公司上市。 
创业板市场为我国中小企业融资创造了条件，但是由于其上市条件较为宽
松，随之而来的风险也高于主板市场。美国的纳斯达克是目前比较成功的创业板，
经历了 8 年兴盛、8 年衰落，其他国家的创业板市场，包括英国、日本、韩国、
中国香港，都经历过“泡沫时代”。同样中国的创业板市场也会有各样的问题。 
北京师范大学公司治理与企业发展研究中心于 2011 年 12 月 11 日正式发布
了《中国上市公司高管薪酬指数(2011)》，研究发现，中国创业板上市公司的高管
薪酬指数较高，呈现严重的激励过度现象。其中 59 家创业板上市公司 2010 年共
花费 1.36 亿元来支付高管薪酬，而这 59 家上市公司当年的净利润为 68.43 亿元，
高管薪酬占净利润的比重达到了 1.99%，远远高于主板 0.47%的比重。然而，尽
管在如此之高的薪酬的“滋养”之下，创业板高管的减持套现甚至是辞职套现却
汹涌如潮。Wind 统计数据则显示，2011 年以来，创业板上市公司共计发生了 607














元。2011 年 10 月间，被多家网络转载的一篇评论①提到创业板公司“高管薪酬
与业绩虽有一定关联，但关联度不高”。19 家创业板公司 2010 年的高管薪酬同
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